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In Hill v Van Erp,1 the High Court held that a duty of care may be owed by a solicitor to the 
beneficiary of a client where the interests of the client and the intended beneficiary coincide. This 
decision was relied upon in Badenach v Calvert2 to argue that the appellant, the solicitor of Mr 
Doddridge, owed a duty to the respondent, the sole beneficiary of Doddridge’s estate. 
The facts were that Doddridge, the testator, retained the appellant to prepare his will, bequeathing 
the whole of his estate to the respondent. The respondent was the son of the testator’s de facto 
spouse. The main assets subject of the will was two properties the testator and the respondent 
owned as tenants-in-common. The will was correctly prepared and executed. However, when taking 
instructions, the appellant did not make enquiries as to whether the testator had any family. Had 
this question been asked, the appellant would have been aware that there was a daughter and 
therefore there was a possibility that she could make a statutory claim for maintenance against her 
father’s estate under the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1912 (Tas). 
After the testator died, his estranged daughter was successful in her claim against the estate. The 
respondent’s bequest was reduced significantly. The respondent claimed that the appellant owed 
him a duty of care as a beneficiary, alleging that by failing to make the appropriate enquiries and 
thereby failing to advise as to how a claim for testator’s family maintenance could be avoided, he 
suffered loss. 
At first instance the Supreme Court of Tasmania3 agreed that the appellant should have made 
inquiries as to the existence of family who could claim against the estate, however, it was not 
accepted that on the balance of probabilities that this would have led to the testator extending the 
terms of the retainer to include advice as to how to protect the respondent’s inheritance.  On appeal 
to the Full Court4 it was held that the appellant’s duty included not only to inquire as to family, but 
also to advise of the possibility of a claim against the estate and to advise of the steps that could be 
taken to avoid such a claim. The court held that the duty owed to the beneficiary could not be less 
than that owed under the terms of the retainer to the testator and that the interest of the 
beneficiary and the testator were aligned. It was held that a duty of care was owed to the 
respondent and that it had been breached.  
The decision of the Full Court was reversed by the High Court on appeal. Applying the principles of 
Hill v Van Erp,5 the court held that no duty was owed to the respondent as beneficiary. The case 
highlights the importance of analysing the facts of novel duty cases to determine whether by 
analogy it may be argued that a duty of care exists. As French CJ, Kiefel and Keane JJ in their joint 
judgment observed: 
This case might, at least on a first impression, be thought to bear some similarity to Hill v 
Van Erp.  The client's initial instructions disclosed an intention that the respondent receive 
the client's property interests under his will.  The respondent has the status of an intended 
beneficiary.  But there the similarity ends.6  
  
The decision of Hill v Van Erp 
In Hill v Van Erp the testatrix instructed the solicitor to prepare her will, leaving her house and its 
contents to her son and a friend, the respondent, as tenants-in-common and other personal 
property to the respondent as well. In executing the will, the solicitor requested that the 
respondent’s husband act as witness, thereby rendering the will void under s 15(1) of the Succession 
Act 1981 (Qld). The High Court held that in the circumstances, the solicitor owed the respondent a 
duty of care. The solicitor owed a duty of care to the testatrix to exercise reasonable care and skill in 
carrying out the retainer, that being, to give effect to the testamentary intentions of the testatrix. 
Brennan CJ stated: 
… generally a solicitor's duty is owed solely to the client subject to the rules and standards of 
the profession (see White v Jones [1995] 2 AC 207 at 223). … But the interests of a client 
who retains a solicitor to carry out the client's testamentary instructions and the interests of 
an intended beneficiary are coincident. 
Most testators seek the assistance of a solicitor to make their intentions effective. The very 
purpose of a testator's retaining of a solicitor is to ensure that the testator's instructions to 
make a testamentary gift to a beneficiary result in the beneficiary's taking that gift on the 
death of the testator.7 
If the interests of the solicitor’s client do not coincide with the interests of the third party, this goes 
against the finding of a duty of care as a solicitor owes a duty to act in their client interests.8  
Badenach v Calvert 
One important difference between the facts of Hill v Van Erp and Badenach v Calvert is that the 
negligence in Van Erp was the incorrect execution of a will, whereas in Badenach, it was alleged that 
the solicitor was negligent by failing to advise the testator. As the duty owed by a solicitor to a client 
is defined by the terms of the retainer,9  identifying the instructions of the testator was crucial to 
determine whether a duty was owed to the respondent. In Badenach v Calvert, Gageler J stated:  
The testator’s instructions are critical. The existence of those instructions compels the 
solicitor to act for the benefit of the intended beneficiary to the extent necessary to give 
effect to them. The instructions define the benefit, absence of which constitutes the damage 
which is the gist of the cause of action in negligence.10 
The testator retained the appellant to prepare a will to benefit the respondent. The High Court 
noted that the will was drawn up according to the deceased’s instructions. The issue was whether 
that the retainer also required the appellant to advise as to the possibility of a claim for testator’s 
family maintenance against the estate. The court noted that a solicitor exercising the ‘requisite 
professional skill and care’11 should have queried the lack of provision in the will for any family 
member. This query would have revealed the existence of the testator’s daughter and the appellant 
then would have been obliged to advise the client of the possibility of a claim for testator’s family 
maintenance.  The court held that advising of possibility of claims by family members against the 
estate would be within the terms of the retainer, as there was ‘a duty to ensure that the client gives 
consideration to the claims that might be made upon his estate before giving final instructions as to 
his testamentary dispositions’.12  
However, the respondent’s claim went further than this, alleging that the appellant should have 
advised the testator as to how to avoid such claims by either converting the co-ownership of the 
properties from tenants-in-common to a joint tenancy or making inter vivos gifts to the respondent. 
Such advice was characterised as relevant to the testator’s property interests and therefore not 
within the terms of the retainer to carry out the testator’s instructions to prepare a will to give effect 
to the testamentary intentions.  French CJ, Kiefel and Keane JJ stated: 
Whilst advice about the possibility of a claim against his estate is clearly relevant in the 
context of the retainer, advice about how to avoid such a claim by inter vivos transactions 
with property interests is not.  From the solicitor's perspective it could not be assumed that 
the client would need this latter advice.13   
Further, the High Court noted that the duty recognised in Hill v Van Erp was narrow and gave effect 
to the testamentary intention as the interests of the testatrix and beneficiary were the same. In 
Badenach v Calvert, all members of the court found that there was no alignment of interest between 
the testator and the respondent. French CJ, Kiefel and Keane stated: 
 
The duty for which the respondent contends cannot be said to be owed to the respondent 
as an intended beneficiary.  That is apparent from the nature of the advices and the point at 
which they should have been given.  The advices which the respondent says should have 
been given in discharge of that duty would have rendered it unnecessary for the client to 
name the respondent as a beneficiary in his will. 
 
The interests of the client and the respondent as parties to the proposed inter vivos 
transactions are not the same as those of a testator and intended beneficiary with respect to 
the execution of final testamentary intentions.  The advices and warnings which the solicitor 
would need to give about such transactions would reflect that their interests are not 
coincident.  For instance, at any point prior to completion of the creation of the joint 
tenancies or the gift, the client could change his mind despite any promise having been 
made to the respondent.  This is not a circumstance which could arise where a solicitor was 
merely carrying into effect a testator's intentions as stated in his or her final will.14 
 
Gageler J agreed, holding that the Full Court had erred by treating: 
… the scope of the duty of care which the [appellant] owed to [the respondent] as co-
extensive with the scope of the duty of care which the [appellant] owed to the Testator.  The 
scope of the [appellant’s] undoubted duty of care to [the respondent] was certainly 
encompassed within the scope of the duty of care which the [appellant] owed to the 
Testator.  In a critical respect, however, it was narrower.15 
Gordon J, delivering a short judgment, simply asked was a duty owed, if yes, what was the scope of 
the duty, had it been breached and did the respondent suffer loss due to the breach.16 Her Honour 
held: 
The appellants owed a duty of care to the testator to use reasonable care in the preparation 
of his will.  The appellants breached that duty.  However, the appellants did not owe and 
could not have owed a duty of care to [the respondent] because, at the relevant time, it 
cannot be said that the interests of the testator and [the respondent] were the same, 
consistent or coincident.  As the appellants did not owe any duty of care to [the 
respondent], there could be no breach.17 
Her Honour emphasised that ‘Hill v Van Erp is not authority for the proposition that a solicitor 
instructed to prepare a will always owes a duty of care to an intended beneficiary’.18 The interests of 
the parties in this case were not consistent at the time of the alleged breach as the respondent was 
not an intended beneficiary in the same way that the respondent was in Hill v Van Erp.19 In Hill v Van 
Erp all that needed to be done to carry out the intended bequest was done, it was the negligent 
execution of the will that resulted in the loss. In contrast, in Badenach v Calvert additional 
instructions from the testator were required to achieve that same position.  
Causation 
Although all members of the court agreed no duty was owed to the respondent, the issue of 
causation was addressed.  Section 13(1)(a) of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) requires that the 
breach of duty be ‘a necessary element of the occurrence of the harm’ and the onus rests upon the 
plaintiff.20  
Another difference between the facts of Hill v Van Erp I and Badenach v Calvert was the classification 
of the loss. The loss suffered by the intended beneficiary in Van Erp was the loss of a share in the 
estate, however, in Badenach the loss was defined as a loss of chance or opportunity. The loss of 
opportunity was identified by the Full Court as  the loss of the prospect that the testator may have 
taken steps to avoid the claim against his estate had he been advised.21 In Tabet v Gett,22 it was held 
that damage in the form of a loss of a chance involves the application of a lower standard of proof – 
the plaintiff must establish that on the balance of probabilities the chance existed.  The High Court 
did not think that classifying the respondent’s loss this way improved his case on causation.23 
The respondent was not able to provide evidence as to what the testator would have done had the 
appellant asked about family members and warned of the possibility of a claim against the estate. As 
French CJ, Kiefel and Keane JJ observed, the testator had only had contact with his daughter once 
since 1973 and therefore he would have had to made enquiries about her circumstances to be able 
to provide the appellant with sufficient information to assess the possibility of a claim being made 
and the possibility of it being successful.24 Their Honours held that as the avenues open to the 
testator had he been informed of the potential of a testator’s family maintenance claim were varied, 
from instructing the appellant to take all possible steps to avoid a claim to maintaining his original 
instructions, there was no compelling evidence of what the testator would have chosen to do. They 
stated: 
Even if it be accepted that the solicitor came under a duty to advise the client in the terms 
alleged, it cannot be concluded, on the balance of probabilities, what course of action the 
client would then have taken.  In addition to the choices available to the client, there would 
have been other matters put to the client for his consideration including the risks concerning 
the irreversible nature of the inter vivos transactions, and the associated cost and delay.25 
Conclusion 
Badenach v Calvert highlights the importance of the need to argue by analogy and comparison when 
attempting to establish that a duty of care is owed in a novel situation. In Hill v Van Erp the High 
Court was influenced by the fact that the interests of the solicitor’s client and the intended 
beneficiary were coincidental, even though the duty owed to the beneficiary was narrower than the 
duty owed to the client. On the face of it, the facts of Badenach v Calvert appear to be similar – a will 
prepared by a solicitor intended to bequeath property to a specified beneficiary failed to fulfil the 
intentions of the testator. However, as noted by the High Court, the facts upon closer inspection 
were very different. The first step in determining whether a solicitor will owe a duty to a third party 
always needs to start with identifying the terms of the retainer, as no duty can be owed to a third 
party that exceeds the duty that would be owed to the client. As Gageler J stated, ‘Where the 
testator's instructions stop, so does the solicitor's duty of care to the intended beneficiary’.26 
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